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ABSTRACT: Two views continue to be defended today. One is that the account of 
eudaimonia in EN 10 is inconsistent with claims made about it in other books of the work. 
The other view is that the account in EN 10 is consistent with other claims made in the 
other books because Aristotle presents one account of perfect eudaimonia by portraying it 
as consisting solely in contemplative activity. I call this view the intellectualist 
interpretation. I then argue that neither view is correct because although Aristotle’s 
position is consistent, he does not hold that the perfect eudaimonia for a human being 
involves nothing but excellent theoretical activity. His philosopher possesses and exercises 
the moral excellences and practical wisdom and so some portion of his happiness consists 
in these activities as well as contemplative activity. 
KEYWORDS: Aristotle, Contemplation, Intellectual Virtue, Eudaimonia 
 
Nicomachean Ethics (EN) 10.7-8 contains Aristotle’s final remarks in this work 
about his view of the nature of happiness (eudaimonia). The account relies on an 
extended treatment of the value of the theoretical or contemplative life as compared 
to the value of the practical or political life. I hope to show that a careful examination 
of these final chapters of the Nicomachean Ethics helps to reveal that there is an 
overlooked but reasonable alternative to the ways in which the majority of 
researchers today understand the import of Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia in EN 
10. Since it does not seem to be an exaggeration to say that the texts of the 
Nicomachean Ethics discussed in this paper have received as much or more attention 
in the past 50 years as any other texts of ancient Greek philosophy, it will not be 
possible in the space of the paper both to defend my interpretation of the texts and 
demonstrate how and why it should be judged to be a more acceptable interpretation 
than the numerous and distinct views currently on offer. I will, however, provide 
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some general remarks about how the view favored here differs from the kinds of 
interpretation that most scholars support today and then leave it to the reader to 
decide whether the position I defend does or does not square better with their own 
reading of Aristotle.  
For generations scholars have been divided over precisely how to interpret 
what Aristotle says about eudaimonia in EN 10 and how to relate his account of it 
here to what he says or implies about it in the other books of the EN. Since the 
debate is so familiar, it would be tedious, if not impossible, to provide all of the 
details of its history here. But it will be useful for the purpose of explaining my 
position to describe, briefly, five views that have been most frequently defended. 
One is that the argument of 10.7-8 is inconsistent with the claims made about 
eudaimonia in the other books of the treatise.1 The reasons offered for this 
judgement differ somewhat from one interpreter to another, but the following 
consideration is one that is frequently advanced by those who take the EN to end 
with an incoherent theory of the human good. In an earlier paper, Christopher Rowe 
expressed the point this way: 
X.7… proposes a life exclusively devoted to theōria, which it directly contrasts with 
the life of practical activity, and of the exercise of the practical aretai. Yet it may 
be said at once that this position is wholly anomalous. … [A]s is obvious, nearly the 
whole of the rest of the EN has centred on the practical aretai which are here so 
cavalierly devalued, on the apparent understanding that these are at least central 
to eudaimonia; and indeed we find Aristotle resuming the same standpoint, without 
apology, in the final chapter of book X, immediately after rounding off his remarks 
on the superiority of the theoretical life at the end of chapter 8. … [I]t appears that 
Aristotle thinks it perfectly reasonable to argue simultaneously that practical 
activity of the right kind is essential to eudaimonia, and that eudaimonia really—
and exclusively—consists in theoretical activity. How can that be?2 
                                                        
1 See, for example, Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 373-377; Jonathan Lear, The Desire to Understand (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 309-
320; Christopher Rowe, “The Good for Man in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” in Studi sull’etica di 
Aristotele, ed. Antonina M. Alberti (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1990), 193-225, especially 217.  
2 Rowe, “The Good for Man,” 218. Rowe has now abandoned this view and accepted an 
interpretation that is similar to the one we find in Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993). My own interpretation is similar to Broadie’s, so I am very happy 
to know that Rowe, an eminent scholar, now accepts an interpretation of Aristotle close to the one 
I have been defending for some years now. See his “The Best Life According to Aristotle (and 
Plato): A Reconsideration,” in Theoria: Studies on the Status and Meaning of Contemplation in 
Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Pierre Destrée and Marco Zingano (Louvain-La-Neuve: Peeters, 2014), 273-
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The complaint here is that in numerous passages throughout the EN, Aristotle 
clearly states or implies that excellent practical activity (i.e., practically wise and 
morally virtuous activity) is, at the very least, a constituent of the highest good for 
human beings, an essential component of human eudaimonia. But in 10.7-8, the 
highest human good, the perfect or complete happiness, seems to turn out to be 
constituted by contemplative activity (theōria) alone. Let us call this view the 
Inconsistency Interpretation. 
Other interpreters, maintain that the argument of book 10 is consistent with 
the other parts of the EN.3 They hold that book 10 defends an Intellectualist 
Conception of eudaimonia, but it is an intellectualist position that coheres well with 
the rest of the treatise. In my view, Kraut4 and Richardson Lear5 have produced the 
most ingenious and detailed defenses of this sort of reading, so in what follows I will 
take abstract and generalized versions of their positions to represent what I am 
calling the Intellectualist Interpretation. According to the view, Aristotle believes, 
throughout the EN, that (1) the best life for a human being is contemplative or 
philosophical activity engaged in within a complete and substantial period of life; 
(2) the philosopher rightly takes the practical virtues to be intrinsic goods, and he 
fully possesses these virtues himself; (3) the philosopher correctly judges that the 
exercise of the practical virtues does not constitute any part of his eudaimonia, for 
he also correctly judges that his eudaimonia consists in contemplation alone; but (4) 
he recognizes, nevertheless, that a life whose ultimate end consists in the exercise of 
                                                        
286. 
3 Among these interpreters, see Anthony Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996); Robert Heinaman, “Eudaimonia and Self-sufficiency in the Nicomachean Ethics”, 
Phronesis, Vol. 33, no. 1 (1988): 31-53; Richard Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1991); C.D.C. Reeve, Practices of Reason: Aristotle's Nicomachean 
Ethics (Clarendon Press, 1995), Joachim Aufderheide, “The Content of Happiness: a New Case for 
Theôria,”, in The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant, ed. Joachim Aufderheide and Ralf M. Bader 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); David Charles, “Aristotle on Well-Being and Intellectual 
Contemplation,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73, no. 1 (1999): 205–223; John M. 
Cooper, “Plato and Aristotle on ‘Finality’ and ‘Sufficiency’,” in Knowledge, Nature, and the Good: 
Essays on Ancient Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 270-308; Gavin 
Lawrence, “Snakes in Paradise: Problems in the Ideal Life”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. XLIII Supplement (2005): 126-165 and David Roochnik, “Aristotle’s Defense of the 
Theoretical Life,” Review of Metaphysics, 61, no. 4 (2008): 711-735. 
4 Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good. 




the practical virtues is good enough to count as a happy life, for it involves an 
excellent use of reason and aims at truth, and (5) the exercise of the practical virtues 
causally promotes (Kraut) or is an approximation of the philosopher’s own superbly 
rational life (Richardson Lear).6  
A third interpretation maintains that eudaimonia consists in the totality of 
intrinsic goods, including both excellent practical activity as well as excellent 
theoretical activity. The original defender of this ‘inclusive end’ view was John 
Ackrill (cf. his “Aristotle on Eudaimonia”); a less extreme variant of this kind of 
interpretation was proposed by David Keyt.7 He argued that eudaimonia, for 
Aristotle, does not consist in the totality of intrinsic goods, but only in both excellent 
contemplative activity and excellent practical activity. He called this the 
‘superstructure’ view. My interpretation is similar to Keyt’s in some ways and very 
different in other ways.8 
                                                        
6 Richardson Lear, Happy Lives, presents a detailed account of how she thinks the notion of 
teleological approximation works inside and outside of the EN. My view is that there is scant 
evidence that Aristotle believed, in the EN, that excellent practical activities are good (and indeed 
intrinsically good) because they approximate excellent theoretical activities. First, I can find no 
unquestionable textual support for this position in EN 10 or elsewhere in the EN. In fact, 
Richardson Lear concedes this point (p. 90) but oddly is not troubled by it. Second, although she 
concedes that Aristotle holds that excellent practical activities, such as the exercise of the moral 
virtues, are intrinsically valuable, her interpretation implies that the value of such activities derives 
from the value they inherit from excellent theoretical activity. But it is entirely unclear how, on 
her interpretation, we are to understand how the value of excellent practical activities can be 
intrinsic to them rather than extrinsic to them. A further objection to Richardson Lear’s position 
is that it proves too much: the crafts, according to Aristotle, involve reason and truthfulness too 
(EN 6.3, 1139b14-17 and 6.4, 1140a20-21) and therefore should also approximate excellent 
theoretical activity and thus constitute some form of eudaimonia. But Aristotle, we know, never 
suggests such a thing. On the contrary, in the Politics, he makes it clear that those who occupy 
themselves with the crafts are incapable of virtue and therefore eudaimonia (7.9, 1328b39ff., 
1329a19-21, 8.2, 1337b8-11). 
7 “Intellectualism in Aristotle,” in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. 2, ed. J.P. Anton and 
A. Preus (Albany, New York SUNY Press, 1983), 364-387. ForAckrill’s paper, see Essays on 
Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 15-34. 
8 Keyt believed that the references to a perfect and secondary eudaimonia in EN 10 were to be 
understood as different aspects of a single conception of eudaimonia. I think this is incorrect and 
Aristotle means what he says: there are two different types of eudaimonia. On the other hand, I 
believe that the perfectly happy life, for Aristotle, includes not only contemplative activity but 
excellent moral activity as well, and so the perfectly happy life captures much of what Keyt 
regarded as the alleged single type of happy life he thought Aristotle was discussing in EN 10. 
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A recent interpretation may be distinct from those already considered, but it 
is difficult to say since it has some features that are similar to other views that have 
been defended. The position holds that contemplation is a divine good while morally 
excellent and politically wise activity is a purely human good. Those who can 
incorporate both types of activity in their lives will realize the perfect eudaimonia 
whereas those who can only achieve a life organized around excellent political 
activity can achieve only the secondary form of eudaimonia.9 
Although I disagree, in some way or other, with all of the foregoing 
interpretations, my view is much closer to the interpretations of Broadie,10 Bush11 
and Dahl12 than any of the others. My disagreement with Broadie, Bush, and Dahl 
has to do primarily with their inclusion of grand scale excellent political activity into 
the perfectly eudaimon life (which I think is inconsistent with Aristotle’s claim that 
the contemplative life is more self-sufficient than the political life). But I agree with 
these interpreters, against others, that some form of practically excellent activity 
must be a component of the perfectly happy human life. 
It is clear that both the Inconsistency Interpretation and the Intellectualist 
Interpretation share the view that in EN 10 Aristotle believes that the happiness of 
the philosopher can be constituted only by contemplative activity. However, I 
believe that there are good reasons to question this view and hold instead that some 
part of the happiness found in the life of Aristotle’s philosopher is constituted by 
practically wise and morally virtuous activities. Note, first, that when Aristotle 
concludes his function argument in EN 1.7, he adds that excellent activity must 
occur over a compete life in order for eudaimonia to be achieved (a complete life is 
not necessarily a life that involves a continuity of happiness or one that is typically 
lengthy since EN 1.8-11 reveals that one can lose and regain one’s happiness and 
one’s relatively short adult life might be a happy one). Consequently, eudaimonia 
cannot consist merely in any episodes of particular sorts of excellent activity. It must 
involve excellent activity in a complete life, as Broadie and Dahl have shown.13 
                                                        
9 This is the interpretation offered by Bush. 
10 Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, and Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe, Aristotle. 
Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
11 Stephen Bush, “Divine and Human Happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Philosophical 
Review 117, no. 1 (2008): 49-75. 
12 Dahl, N. O. “Contemplation and eudaimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics,” in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical Guide, ed. Jon Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011). 
13 See Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, and Dahl, “Contemplation and Eudaimonia”. 
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Furthermore, to understand what Aristotle is up to in EN 10, it is necessary to 
recall what was said earlier in book 1. In both EN 1 and Eudemian Ethics (EE) 1, 
Aristotle refers to what seems to have been a traditional, but still current, starting-
point for discussions about the nature of the human good or eudaimonia. This is the 
renowned image of the three prominent or most favored types of life: “we see three 
lives”, he says, “which all who have the resources choose to live, the political [life], 
the philosophical [life], and the [life] of enjoyment (politikon, philosophon, 
apolaustikon).14 With each of these lives Aristotle associates a particular good an 
agent’s desire for which, and pursuit of which, characterizes the life, and one or 
another historical figure whose life can be subsumed under one of the three 
headings. Thus, the apolaustic life is typified by the pursuit of, and desire for, bodily 
pleasure and play, and Aristotle points to both the Assyrian king Sardanapallus and 
a certain Smindyrides of Sybara as examples of those who pursued such a life. The 
good that is of major concern in the political life turns out to be a certain form of 
excellent practical activity, providing that we are talking about a good or “true” 
political life (otherwise ends such money, honor, and gaining unfair advantage over 
others are associated with this life).15 Aristotle does not explicitly connect a 
particular individual with the political life in his discussions of the three lives. 
However, remarks made elsewhere indicate that he would count such men as Solon 
and Pericles among those who had lived good lives of this type.16 The philosophical 
or theoretical life is typified by a concern with the good of contemplative wisdom. 
Aristotle’s favorite example of a person who had lived the philosophical life is 
Anaxagoras. Like Aristotle himself, Anaxagoras abandoned his life as a citizen of his 
native city17 in order to study philosophy in the city of Athens as a metoikos (metic, 
resident alien). According to the biographical tradition, Anaxagoras spent about 
thirty years in Athens where he became a friend and teacher of Pericles. However, 
he fled Athens when charges of impiety and Medism were brought against him by 
some of Pericles’ political enemies. He then took up residence in the city of 
Lampsacus18, where he continued to engage in philosophical contemplation until his 
death. According to Aristotle, despite having the status of a xenos (guest-friend) in 
                                                        
14 EE 1.4, 1215a35-b1; cf. EN 1.5, 1095b14-1096a5. 
15 See EN 1.13, 1102a7-10; cf. EN 1.9, 1099b28-32, EE 1216a24-27.  
16 Pericles: EN 6.5, 1140b7-11; Solon: EN 10.9, 1179a9-13 where Aristotle uses Solon’s testimony 
to confirm his argument. Aristotle implies that he takes Solon to be wise at a16-17. 
17 Clazomenae (now Urla). 
18 Present day Lapseki. 
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the city, the people of Lampsacus gave him a public burial in honor of his theoretical 
wisdom.19  
I believe the image of the three favored types of life explains the structure of 
the argument we find at the end of the EN, specifically the argument that runs from 
chapters 6 through 8 of book 10. At the beginning of EN 10.6, Aristotle says: “We 
have discussed matters pertaining to the virtues, friendships, and pleasures. It 
remains for us to discuss eudaimonia in outline.”20 In 10.6, Aristotle discusses and 
refutes the view that eudaimonia consists in a life devoted to the pleasures of play or 
amusement; after this, in 10.7-8, he argues that theōria is (or is the central 
component of) the perfect or complete happiness (hē teleia eudaimonia) and thus 
the life of the intellect (ho kata ton noun bios) is the happiest life for a human 
being.21 He contrasts this philosophical life with one he calls “the life in accordance 
with the other excellence” (ho kata tēn allēn aretēn: EN 10.8, 1178a9), but maintains 
that the latter type of life deserves to be called happy as well, though only in a 
secondary way (deuterōs). I propose that the life that is happy in a secondary way is 
a certain species of the practical life, viz., an excellent political life. Unless this is 
correct, it is difficult to see how Aristotle can be understood to conclude his account 
of eudaimonia in the EN with his answer to the question raised in book 1: which of 
the three favored types of life is happy? And if the life in accordance with the other 
excellence is not a life of excellent political activity, then what might it be? To say 
that it is a life devoted to the exercise of the practical excellences simpliciter, would 
seem to require us to embrace the inconsistency interpretation. For on this reading, 
Aristotle would be contrasting the contemplative life with a life of morally excellent 
and practically wise activities, and then in elevating the contemplative life above 
this life, he would indicate that there is a form of human happiness that can be 
enjoyed by a person bereft of moral excellence and practical wisdom. This seems to 
be an intolerable result and thus one we should avoid embracing unless an 
alternative interpretation proves to be implausible.  
                                                        
19 Rh. 2.23, 1398b16-17. 
20 1176a30-32. 
21 EN 10.7, 1177b24-25, 1178a6-8. By saying that theōria is the perfect happiness I take Aristotle 
to mean that contemplation is the good that typifies the life that best or most fully satisfies the 
features that are associated with a happy life (cf. Broadie, 1991). It is the highest or most desirable 
aim of the person to whom we ascribe supreme or unqualified happiness. However, it is not the 
only aim of such a person. As I argue in the paper, excellent practical activity is also a fundamental 
aim of the person living the supremely happy life. Cf. note 40. 
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However, there do appear to be passages throughout 10. 7-8 that imply a sharp 
contrast not merely between a philosophical life and a good political life, but a 
philosophical life and any life that counts as an excellent practical one. For example, 
Aristotle maintains that one reason to equate the perfect eudaimonia with theōria is 
that theōria is the most self-sufficient activity. He defends his claim with the 
following remarks: 
The wise man, no less than the just one and all the rest, requires the necessaries of 
life; but, given an adequate supply of these, the just man also needs people with and 
towards whom he can perform just actions, and similarly with the temperate man, 
the brave man, and each of the others; but the wise man can engage in 
contemplation by himself, and the wiser he is, the more he can do it. No doubt he 
does it better with the help of fellow workers; but for all that he is the most self-
sufficient of men.22  
It seems clear that this passage, and others like them,23 have helped to produce 
Christopher Rowe’s earlier view that EN 10.7 “…proposes a life exclusively devoted 
to theōria, which it directly contrasts with the life of practical activity, and of the 
exercise of the practical aretai” (quoted above, with my emphases).24 But do these 
passages show that the philosophical life is being distinguished from any life that 
counts as a good practical life? Moreover, do they suggest that none of the happiness 
within the philosophical life can be constituted by excellent practical activity? My 
contention is that they do not.  
                                                        
22 1177a28-b1; cf. 1178a28-34. 
23 For example, Aristotle distinguishes between “practical [activities]” and “contemplating” (at 
1177b2-4) and between “actions in accordance with the [practical] excellences” and the “activity 
of the [theoretical] intellect” (at 1177b16-20). At the beginning of 10.8 Aristotle says that “the 
[life] in accordance with the other excellence will be happy in a secondary way, because the 
activities in accordance with it are human” (1178a9-10); he then defends the claim that activities 
in accordance with the “other virtue” are human by arguing that “just and brave acts and the others 
in accordance with the excellences in regard to our dealings with one another…and in the feelings 
too…all appear to be human” (1178a10-14). After this, Aristotle maintains, as he did in book 6, 
that the possession of practical wisdom (phronēsis) entails the possession of the moral excellences, 
and vice versa (1178a16-22). So it certainly looks as if the “other excellence” Aristotle is 
distinguishing here from theoretical wisdom is the totality of the practical excellences—phronēsis 
and the ēthikai aretai. 
24 Rowe now has accepted Broadie’s interpretation. See Christopher J. Rowe, “The Best Life 
According to Aristotle (and Plato). A Reconsideration,” in The Ways of Life in Classical Political 
Philosophy, ed. F.L. Lisi (Madrid: Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin, 2004), 121-133.  
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In what is nearly the first half of 10.7,25 Aristotle does contrast contemplation 
with excellent practical activity with respect to various features that are associated 
with eudaimonia. He argues either that some of these features may be ascribed to 
theōria but not to excellent practical activities or that some of them apply to theōria 
to a greater degree than they apply to excellent practical activities. After presenting 
a number of arguments along these lines, Aristotle considers another point that helps 
move his discussion forward. He writes: 
Eudaimonia seems to be [found in] leisure (scholē), for we occupy ourselves so that 
we may have leisure and we make war so that we may bring about peace. Now the 
activity of the practical virtues occurs in politics or war, and actions with respect 
these [affairs] seem to be without leisure (ascholos). Military actions are completely 
so…. But the activity of the politician (ho politikos) is also without 
leisure…Therefore…among the actions in accordance with the virtues those in 
politics and war are pre-eminently fine and great (kallos kai megethos); but they 
are without leisure….26  
Aristotle goes on to argue that contemplation, rather than political activity, is (or is 
more closely) linked with leisure, self-sufficiency, and “the other things assigned to 
the supremely happy person”.27 He then infers that “the perfect happiness for a 
human being will be this [activity]”.28  
I have said that the life that Aristotle calls happy “in a secondary way” is the 
good political life and not merely any life in which good practical activity is included 
as an aim. One reason to accept this interpretation has now surfaced. For Aristotle 
has just inferred that theōria is the perfect eudaimonia from the fact that it is theōria, 
rather than political activity, that is most closely associated with the attributes that 
attach to being supremely happy. Aristotle calls the life typified by theōria “the life 
of the intellect.” But, in 10.7-8, the life that is “happy in a secondary way” is the only 
life that Aristotle contrasts with the life of the intellect. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to assume that it is good political activity that typifies the life that is 
happy in a secondary way.29 A passage in 10.8 supplies further support for this 
conclusion. Aristotle writes: 




28 1177b24-25: hē teleia eudaimonia autē an eiē anthropōu. 
29 At this point one might wonder why Aristotle seems to compare contemplation to excellent 
practical activity quite generally if his intention is to distinguish the philosophical life from an 
excellent political life. In reply to this question, I will note, first, that in the Politics Aristotle uses 
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The virtues of the composite are human; thus both the life and the happiness in 
accordance with these [are human]. But the happiness of the intellect is separate. 
...It would seem, also, to stand in little need of external resources or less than [the 
happiness/the virtue?] of character (tēs ēthikēs). For both require the necessities [of 
life] and in equal measure, even if the politician (politikos) labors more about the 
body and things of that sort. For in this there may be little difference. But with 
respect to their activities, there will be a great difference.30  
Although there are questions about how to translate and interpret much of 
this notorious passage, here we need only focus on one obvious fact about it: there 
is a smooth transition in the passage from talk about the external resources needed 
to engage in activities expressing an excellent character (ho ēthikos) to talk about 
the activities of the politician. The best explanation for this fact, I think, is that 
Aristotle is taking an excellent political life to be the specific type of excellent 
practical life to which he is comparing the philosophical life. 
That Aristotle regards the political life as a species of the practical life is 
beyond question. In EN 6.8, he claims that politikē (the virtue of the excellent 
politician) is one form of phronēsis. It is practical wisdom operating in regard to the 
good of the polis and is thus distinguished from the use of practical wisdom in regard 
to the good of the self or the individual alone (and to which popular discourse has 
incorrectly restricted the term). Politikē, as Aristotle understands it, is the 
intellectual virtue that is exercised in the practical domains of legislation, 
deliberation, and judicature.31 In the Politics, Aristotle tells us that an excellent ruler 
is good and is practically wise (phronimos)32; in fact, he declares that “phronēsis is 
the only distinctive virtue (idios aretē) of the ruler.”33 Moreover, he claims that a 
                                                        
the expressions “political life” and “practical life” interchangeably (cf. Pol. 7. 2, 1324a27). 
Apparently, the debate between advocates of the political life and advocates of the philosophical 
life was typically referred to as a debate between proponents of the practical life and proponents 
of the philosophical life (see Timothy Roche, “The Private Moral Life of Aristotle’s Philosopher: A 
Defense of a Non-Intellectualist Interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics 10.7-8,” in Contemplation 
in Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Pierre Destrée and Marco Zingano (Leuven: Peeters, 2014), 222ff.) for 
additional evidence about the manner in which this debate was framed). Secondly, Aristotle’s own 
conception of a good political life can easily explain why he thinks of it as a life in accordance with 
the practical virtues. In particular, he thinks of political virtue as a certain form of practical 
wisdom. See pp. 40-41. 
30 1178a20-28. 
31 1141b23-1142a10. 
32 3.4, 1277a13-15. 
33 1277b25-26. 
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ruler must have complete moral excellence,34 a point we would expect him to make 
if the Politics is consistent with the EN on the relationship between practical wisdom 
and moral excellence. In Aristotle’s view, then, the excellent politician is involved 
in the project of realizing not merely his own personal good but the good for his 
entire polis.35 Thus, Aristotle’s good politician exercises the practical excellences, but 
he does so on a grand scale. He engages in virtuous activity in the public arena and 
his actions are for the sake of the well being of his entire political community. This 
is why Aristotle believes that excellent political actions are “pre-eminently fine and 
great” (kallos kai megethos; cf. quoted passage on p. 39). It is also part of the 
explanation for why Aristotle sometimes writes as if he is contrasting the theoretical 
life with any life devoted to morally excellent and practically wise activities.36 For 
the morally excellent and practically wise activities that can serve as the primary 
component of a happy life must be pre-eminently fine and great to have such a 
consequential implication for a human life. 
However, the fact that virtuous political actions are pre-eminently fine and 
great actions implies that a political life must be both less self-sufficient than, and 
less leisurely than, a philosophical life. Aristotle tells us that “for actions many things 
are needed, and the greater and finer [the actions] the more numerous are the things 
[needed]”.37 The politician, in order to be successful, must be concerned with his 
own possession and regular use of a considerable number of external goods, such as 
wealth, political friends, honor, power, etc. He also needs to be concerned with 
acquiring external goods for his polis, for he must see to it that the citizens of his 
polis have an opportunity to realize as much happiness for themselves as is possible 
given their natures and the conditions that have shaped their political system.38 
                                                        
34 1.13, 1260a17-18. 
35 Cf. 1.2, 1094b7-10, 1.9, 1099b28-32, 1.13, 1102a7-10. 
36 The other elements of the explanation have to do first, with the longstanding dispute between 
the advocates of the political life (understood as a life of praxis) and the advocates of the 
philosophical life (understood as a life of theoria or the life of the spectator). Cf. Plato, Gorgias 
484c-486d, 500c1-d4, Republic 592a3-b4, Theatetus 172c-177b. Second, the fundamental 
component of a happy life is a certain sort of action or activity for Aristotle. Since excellent 
political activity involves certain sorts of practically wise, just, magnificent, even-tempered acts, 
etc. it is easy to appear to refer to practical activity in general rather than the more specific activity 
of politics when discussing the excellent political life. 
37 1178b1-3: pros de tas praxeis pollōn deitai kai osō an meizous kai kallious. 
38 Cf. EN 1094a26-1094b11, 1099b28-32, 1102a7-10, 1129b14-17, 1130b23-29, 1160a8-14, 1163b5-
12, Pol. 1280b29-1281a8, 1282b14-18, 7.5-6, 8-9 (esp. 1329a17-26), 10-12, 13 (esp. 1332a7-32). 
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Happiness for a polis, like happiness for an individual, depends upon an adequate 
supply of external goods.39 The politician must do whatever he can to help his polis 
to acquire, preserve, and properly employ such goods. Thus, the politician’s life is 
wrapped up with the pursuit of external goods in a way that the philosopher’s life is 
not.  
But the politician’s dependence on, and concern with, a large number of 
external goods reveals that Aristotle’s philosophical life cannot be a political life as 
well (at least it is unlikely to be so within deviant political regimes where the 
extensive concern with external goods and the demands of political office may be so 
time-consuming and complex as to preclude rigorous and sustained theoretical 
activity). If Aristotle were to take his philosopher to live a political life as well as a 
philosophical life, then he could not say, as he does, that the philosopher enjoys a 
greater degree of self-sufficiency and leisure than the politician enjoys. For any lack 
of self-sufficiency and leisure that attaches to the political life would then attach 
equally to the philosophical life, and the contrast between the two lives, and hence 
an important reason for ranking the philosophical life as happier than the political 
life, would be obliterated. It is on this point that my interpretation must be 
distinguished from those advocated by Broadie,40 Bush,41 and Dahl.42 
However, Aristotle makes it perfectly clear that his philosopher does aim at 
excellent practical activity. He tells us that in so far as a philosopher is “a human 
being and lives with many others, he chooses to act in accordance with virtue; for 
he will need those sorts of things [i.e., external goods] towards living a human life”.43 
Aristotle is claiming here that the philosopher will choose to act in accordance with 
the moral virtues and therefore will also pursue the external goods that are needed 
to exercise those virtues, such as money, for the sake of acting generously and justly, 
strength, for the sake of acting bravely, and opportunity, for the sake of acting 
temperately.44 In fact, Aristotle implies that the philosopher will choose to pursue 
these external goods even though his attention to them can be regarded as 
impediments (empodia) to his contemplative activity.45  
                                                        
39 See, for example, EN 1099a31-b7, Pol. 1329a17-19, 1323a40-41, 1332a7-29. 
40 Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle. 
41 Bush, “Divine and Human Happiness.” 
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If the philosopher engages in excellent practical activity, but does not do so as 
a good politician (i.e., as a person who holds political office and acts in accordance 
with the practical virtues for the sake of the common benefit of the citizens of his 
polis), then he must do so in the context of his private life. His excellent practical 
activities for the most part will be performed with, and directed towards, his family, 
friends, and associates.46 But now two questions arise. First, is book 10 implying that 
the philosopher will possess and exercise the practical virtues or is it merely 
indicating that the philosopher will perform actions that are compatible with the 
practical virtues, virtues that he does not possess?47 And second, will the 
philosopher’s good practical activity actually constitute any happiness within his 
life, or does it only contribute to his happiness in the manner of an instrumental 
means? My position is that Aristotle’s philosopher will possess the practical virtues 
and his exercise of these virtues will constitute some of the happiness in his life. I 
cannot fully defend these claims here (because that would require far ranging 
discussions of other parts of Aristotle’s moral and political philosophy than would 
                                                        
46 On this interpretation, the philosopher will pursue external goods in order to engage in excellent 
practical activity beyond what is strictly necessary for his contemplation. Therefore, he will enjoy 
a lesser degree of self-sufficiency and leisure than he would have had if he had engaged in practical 
activity only to secure the external goods required for his contemplation. This does not generate 
the problem alluded to above, viz., that on such a reading the contrast between “the life of the 
intellect” and “the life in accordance with the other excellence” would be effaced. For “the life of 
the intellect” properly understood includes the exercise of the practical excellences almost 
exclusively within the domain of the philosopher’s private affairs, whereas “the life in accordance 
with the other excellence” involves the exercise of the practical excellences on a grand scale. Since 
the political life involves a greater dependence upon external goods than the life of the intellect 
properly understood (i.e., a philosophical life that includes the exercise of excellent practical 
activities in the private domain), it remains less self-sufficient and less leisurely than the life of the 
intellect. 
47 John Cooper once held the view that Aristotle’s philosopher will engage in action that is 
compatible with moral excellence, but not action that expresses, or is a genuine exercise of, the 
state of moral excellence. Cooper held this view because he thought that “anyone who organizes 
his life from the intellectualist outlook cannot care about such actions in the way a truly just or 
temperate or liberal man does.” He claimed that Aristotle’s philosopher “will not possess the social 
virtues, or any other virtues, because he will lack the kind of commitment to this kind of activity 
that is an essential characteristic of the virtuous person” (Reason and Human Good in Aristotle 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1975), 164). But Cooper abandoned this reading and the majority of 
contemporary proponents of the intellectualist interpretation have rejected it as well. (Recently, 
however, he appears to have leaned somewhat back towards the more extreme form of the 
intellectualist view. See Cooper, “Plato and Aristotle on ‘Finality’”.) 
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be possible within the limits of this paper) but I will attempt to explain them more 
fully and present some of my reasons for making them. 
First, consider the following passage from book 10: 
But being a human being he [the person who engages in theōria will also need 
external prosperity; for his nature is not self-sufficient for contemplation, but his 
body also must be healthy, and food and other attention must be provided. Still, 
even if it is not possible to be supremely happy without the external goods, one 
must not think that he who is to be happy will need many things or great things 
(pollōn kai megalōn). For self-sufficiency and action do not depend on excess and 
it is possible to perform fine actions (prattein ta kala) even if one does not rule earth 
and sea; for even from moderate powers one can act in accordance with virtue. This 
is plain to see; for private persons (hoi idiōtai) seem to perform decent actions (ta 
epieikē prattein) not less but even more than those in positions of power (dunastai). 
It is enough to possess this much; for the life of the person who is active in 
accordance with excellence will be happy.48  
The final lines of the passage imply that private persons who perform decent 
actions achieve happiness exactly because their lives are “active in accordance with 
excellence.” The language of the passage here makes it evident that by “excellence” 
Aristotle means moral excellence. Although he does not explicitly say that the 
private persons he is referring to actually have the moral excellences in accordance 
with which they act, there is no reason to deny that this is just what he means.49 
Aristotle is saying that the exercise of the moral excellences constitutes happiness 
for the private persons of whom he is speaking. He believes that whether one 
regularly exercises the practical excellences on an extensive scale—as does the 
                                                        
48 1178b33-1179a9. 
49 The expression kata tēn aretēn could suggest merely the idea of “action compatible with 
excellence” (as it clearly does at 1105a29) but it is quite unlikely that it does at 1179a9. For Aristotle 
regularly uses the expression to convey the notion that excellence is being expressed or exercised. 
Indeed, Aristotle uses the expression in exactly this way at least twice in 10.8 before the passage 
under consideration (1178a9 and 1178a21) and then after the passage he uses the parallel 
expression “the person who is active in accordance with the intellect” (ho kata noun energōn 
[1179a22-23]). Certainly, the latter expression cannot be thought to signify a person whose actions 
are merely compatible with the excellence of theoretical wisdom and not actually expressive of 
the state of theoretical wisdom. Surely the context ensures that it refers to a person who exercises 
the excellence of theoretical wisdom that she possesses. It is impossible to believe that in the 
passage under consideration Aristotle is without any warning suddenly attaching an unusual 
significance to his use of the word “kata” only to employ it soon afterwards in his ordinary fashion 
and once again without providing any warning or explanation for the reader. 
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politician—or in a more limited way in the sphere of one’s private relationships, one 
will attain happiness through the exercise of such excellences.  
The issue now concerns whether the philosophers under discussion are 
included among the private persons who regularly exercise the moral excellences. It 
seems beyond doubt that they are at least included among those who exercise these 
excellences. We know that Aristotle has told us that they choose to act in accordance 
with the moral excellences, and the only others mentioned who so act are the 
politicians who exercise these excellences in a capacious way. Much of the rest of 
the EN suggests that any human being who possesses and regularly exercises the 
moral excellences will thereby attain happiness. So, if the philosopher’s private life 
involves the possession of, and exercise of the moral excellences, then the happiness 
within the life of the philosopher should be, at least partly, constituted by action in 
accordance with the moral excellences.50 Note that in the Politics, Aristotle clearly 
                                                        
50 There are also strong positive reasons to suppose that Aristotle holds that the philosopher’s 
happiness must be partly constituted by the exercise of the practical virtues. Here is one. Given 
Aristotle’s method of establishing his initial definition of the human good by reference to an ergon 
(function) that is idion (proper to, or distinctive of) a human being (in EN 1.7), it is difficult to 
understand how he could think that any form of human happiness could fail to include morally 
excellent and practically wise activities as constitutive elements. For Aristotle makes it clear, in 
the EN, as well as other treatises, that a human being is, essentially and distinctively, an animal 
that has the capacity to engage in practical reasoning, to control through reason his desires and 
emotions, and to share his life in associations with others. If human happiness, for Aristotle, 
consists fundamentally in the excellent actualizations of capacities that are essential to, and 
distinctive of, human beings, then it seems impossible for Aristotle to recognize a type of human 
happiness that fails to include (as constitutive elements) the excellent activities that pertain to the 
practical, desiderative, and social capacities of human beings. In light of this obvious problem, 
intellectualist interpreters often stress the fact that happiness, for Aristotle, is an ultimate end and 
in EN 10 Aristotle clearly has argued that the contemplative life has been shown to satisfy the 
criteria for an ultimate end better than any other end. But the ultimate end must be an end that is 
realizable by a human being, and this precisely why Aristotle emphasizes the fact that in so far as 
the philosopher is a human being living in communities with other human beings, he deliberately 
chooses to act in accordance with [practical] excellence (1178b5-7). It is true that Aristotle believes 
that the philosopher enjoys a kind of divine capacity for theoretical activity, but he recognizes that 
the philosopher is a human being. So, there are two forms of excellent activity that constitute or 
produce happiness for Aristotle: excellent contemplative activity, a divine activity, and excellent 
practical activity, a distinctively human activity. The philosopher qua divine being enjoys the 
happiness that is constituted by theōria. But the philosopher qua human being enjoys the 
happiness constituted by the excellent activity of what is distinctive of (idion) human beings, 
practical reason together with a faculty of desire that is susceptible to rational guidance. For 
Timothy Roche 
46 
regards those who engage in the occupations of farming, commercial business, craft-
work, etc. as incapable of developing the excellences whose exercise constitutes 
eudaimonia (Pol. 6.4, 1318b6-17, 4.6, 1292b25-29, 7.9, 1328b33-1329a2). The lack 
of leisure connected with these occupations, along with the distorting influence of 
the work that is the focus of these occupations, makes concentration on the 
development of moral excellence impossible. So, we may ask: who besides the 
politician is capable of the kinds of morally excellent activity that are central to 
human happiness? I maintain that besides politicians (at least those politicians who 
live in relatively stable political systems) Aristotle regards philosophers as either 
exclusively or predominantly capable of developing the excellences of character, and 
therefore they are both able and motivated to realize some part of their happiness 
through the exercise of their morally excellent states of character. 
I suspect that a proponent of the intellectualist interpretation will resist this 
interpretation in a number of ways. Here are two considerations that might be urged 
against my interpretation. First, it might be said that the contemplative and political 
lives are understood to have different ultimate ends which structure those lives, the 
contemplative life has theōria as its ultimate end while the political life has excellent 
practical activity (deployed for the sake of the common good) as its ultimate end. 
Aristotle does not say, and indeed cannot say, that the contemplative life includes 
multiple ultimate ends (for that would require the impossibility that there is more 
than one end chosen just for its own sake and for the sake of which we choose all 
other ends, cf. EN 1.1-7), and therefore the exercise of practical excellences cannot 
be part of the ultimate end that constitutes the contemplative life. A second 
consideration would be that I have committed myself to the view that Aristotle has 
structured the account of eudaimonia in the EN around the image of the three most 
favored types of life, and his description of those lives indicates that he believes each 
of them is organized around a single good which reveals what kind of life it is. The 
apolaustic life is organized around the pursuit of bodily pleasure, the political life is 
the life that aims just at grand-scale excellent moral activity, and the theoretical life 
strives for excellent contemplative activity. The lives are not described as 
combinations of goods. 
In response to the first objection, it should be noted, first, that it is difficult to 
see how a proponent of the intellectualist interpretation can maintain either that 
Aristotle’s contemplative person is not a morally excellent person (without thereby 
                                                        
Aristotle, a contemplative being whose happiness consists solely and simply in its contemplative 
activity is not a human being. It is a god. 
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embracing the inconsistency interpretation) or that the contemplative person is a 
morally excellent person but does not, somehow, derive some measure of her 
happiness in virtue of the exercise of her moral excellence. For Aristotle makes it 
clear that the morally excellent person is one who takes pleasure in exercising the 
moral excellences, loves the excellences, and loves the doing of fine actions (EN 1.8, 
1099a7-24). Taking pleasure in and loving excellent activity characterizes the 
philosopher’s own state in relation to contemplative activity, activity that 
constitutes the primary component of the perfect happiness. It is not easy to 
understand how acting in accordance with practical excellences constitutes 
happiness for the good politician but fails to constitute any sort of happiness when 
the philosopher performs the same kinds of excellent acts. Second, it may be a 
mistake to think that the case of a morally good philosopher who possesses some 
portion of his happiness from the exercise of the moral excellences makes it 
necessary to say, absurdly, that he has two ultimate ends. In the first place, the 
notion of ultimate end is employed by Aristotle to make eudaimonia the subject of 
discussion in the opening chapters of the EN. It is not until book 10 that Aristotle 
divides eudaimonia into a perfect or complete happiness and a secondary happiness. 
Aristotle’s view may well be that there is one ultimate end for human beings, 
excellent activity, and that ultimate end can (and perhaps must) be realized in 
different ways depending upon the different circumstances, talents, resources, and 
interests of different human beings. The perfect eudaimonia has a partly divine 
element in it due to the fact that the god(s) engage in contemplative activity and 
nothing else. Some human beings can achieve this form of eudaimonia due to their 
capacity for theōria. But they remain human and so have both limits to the extent 
and kind of theōria they can engage in as well as the capacity for and need to exercise 
practical excellences. Excellent politicians, on the other hand, also realize the 
ultimate end of eudaimonia but in a secondary way in virtue of their expansive 
exercise of the practical virtues within the public domain and for the sake of the 
political community. I do not think that Aristotle would sanction talk of choosing 
one’s ultimate end. Human beings have one ultimate end in virtue of the kinds of 
living things they are. But they realize their ultimate end in different ways because 
of the reasons just given. 
Given these points, it is perhaps easier to see now how it is possible to reply 
to the second objection. It is true that Aristotle characterizes the three types of life 
in terms of a single good around which the life in question is organized. But this does 
not, I think, pose a serious problem for the interpretation offered here. In the first 
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place, the three lives image is surely an oversimplification of the kinds of life human 
beings actually live. It serves Aristotle’s purpose to the extent that it focuses our 
attention on the sorts of goods that we regard as very important to us and the image 
probably should not be taken to suggest that Aristotle believed that human beings 
can only have one such good around which they organize their lives. In my view, 
his belief that the human good must be a self-sufficient end (cf. EN 1.7) suggests that 
lives built around the pursuit of a single value cannot be genuinely or unqualifiedly 
happy (although some proponents of the intellectualist interpretation may disagree 
with this as well). But secondly, even though Aristotle explicitly claims that the 
morally good philosopher will often engage in excellent practical activities (because 
she is human), the primary component of her happy life is nonetheless theōria (EN 
10.8, 1178a9-14, 1178b1-8).51 This is the case not because the philosopher fails to 
achieve any sort of happiness through the exercise of her morally excellent and 
practically wise actions, but simply because her theoretical activities constitute the 
central or typifying component of her happiness. That her happy life counts as a 
contemplative life is due to the fact that it is contemplative activity that most 
distinguishes her life from what Aristotle regards as the only other type of life that 
could plausibly count as happy—the excellent political life.52 
                                                        
51 Note that Aristotle does not say that practically excellent activity is intrinsically good and 
included in happiness because it approximates excellent theoretical activity—as one would expect 
if Richardson Lear’s interpretation was correct. Rather, because one is a human being and has both 
a practical intellect and a desiderative and emotional part of the soul, the exercise of excellences 
pertaining to these parts must be included in any form of happiness that a human being might 
attain. 
52 One should not infer from this claim that a human being who engages in morally excellent 
activity within her private life cannot attain some measure of her happiness from that activity. 
Although Aristotle takes excellent contemplative activity and excellent political activity to be the 
central or typifying goods of the two types of happy lives he discusses in EN 10, it is clear now that 
both the excellent contemplative life and the excellent political life involve practical wisdom and 
that practical wisdom and full excellence of character mutually imply one another (EN 10.7, 
1178b5-7, EN 6.8, 12-13). Aristotle tells us at the beginning of EN 6.8 that politikē and phronēsis 
are the same state (hexis), even though their being is not the same. I take this claim to mean that 
the terms refer to the same state or disposition but they are defined differently. But this is so only 
because phronēsis is not necessarily deployed in the most extensive service of the common good, 
as it is when it takes the form of politikē. However, this seems to be a difference of scale or direction, 
not a genuinely fundamental difference. Consequently, in so far as the excellence of phronēsis is 
exercised in a complete human life (and accompanied, necessarily, with excellence of character), it 




                                                        
should have an implication similar to the same sort of exercise as the excellence of politikē, namely, 
some level of eudaimonia. 
